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This study examines the role played by GCHQ during the 1960s. It looks at GCHQ’s overseas Sigint collection network, its relationship with the NSA and the problems caused by decolonisation, economic crisis and military withdrawal from East of Suez. The paper also discusses GCHQ’s intelligence targets in the 1960s, its codebreaking successes and assesses how important Sigint was for British policy towards France, Egypt and Indonesia. It concludes that while Sigint gave Britain tactical benefits in dealing with France and Egypt it was only in the case of Indonesia that Sigint helped Britain to achieve its strategic goals.   

For many years there was a curious gap in the historiography of British external policy. While historians readily acknowledged the immense importance of Ultra and other forms of signals intelligence (Sigint) during the Second World War few of them examined the role played by Sigint or Britain’s Sigint agency, the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), in the post war world. In contrast to the abundant and still growing literature on Ultra writing on GCHQ was sparse.​[1]​ Diplomatic and military historians rarely considered the possible impact of Sigint on British foreign policy or military strategy after 1945.

Over the last few years this missing dimension of Britain’s post war history has been partially filled in, particularly by Richard Aldrich and his ground breaking book The Hidden Hand, which has provided a wealth of detail on GCHQ’s activities in the early Cold War.​[2]​ However, as yet very little has been produced on the post 1960 period. This is perhaps not so surprising; as soon as an historian attempts to work in this field it becomes apparent that from a research point of view, the curious gap is not curious at all because there is a major problem in studying GCHQ, namely official secrecy. Over the years the British government has worked hard to prevent the disclosure of information on GCHQ including even relatively innocuous facts such as the organisation’s budget. GCHQ’s archives are exempt from the normal 30 year rule of security declassification and virtually no documents have been released to the British National Archives for the post 1945 period. Furthermore material supplied by GCHQ has an absolute exemption from the 2000 Freedom of Information Act. Security restrictions also apply to other government bodies that assessed or used Sigint such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). A large number of JIC files from the 1960s have been declassified but the most sensitive items, including discussions of Sigint, were held in the Secretary’s Standard File series and this is still retained. Other references to Sigint in Foreign Office, Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Defence (MOD) documents are routinely redacted. 

The security conventions used at the time create another barrier to documentary research. Aldrich has explained that Foreign Office officials kept GCHQ decrypts in separate special blue files and were told not to refer to Sigint in normal correspondence.​[3]​ Even in MOD documents classified as ‘Top Secret’ officials frequently used euphemisms to disguise references to Sigint. Sigint was called ‘special intelligence’ and Sigint intercept posts were described as ‘special wireless stations’.​[4]​ 

An alternative avenue of research is to use human sources; memoirs, diaries or interviews with former GCHQ personnel and other officials who had connections with Sigint. But again the British government has tried to block the release of information. The government has banned publications and even prosecuted former officials who breached the Official Secrets Act by writing about GCHQ and Sigint. The notorious prosecution of ex-MI5 officer Peter Wright over his book Spycatcher may partly have been inspired by the candid discussion of Sigint in his memoirs. There are other examples, such as the prosecution of Crispin Aubrey, John Berry and Duncan Campbell in the ‘ABC Case’ in the 1970s and the banning of books by Jock Kane, a former GCHQ employee, in the 1980s. 

Research into GCHQ is therefore difficult but it is not impossible. Information from documentary and human sources has gradually emerged over the last 40 years and this article will bring together the limited material available and examine the role played by GCHQ during the 1960s. It will look at GCHQ’s overseas Sigint collection network, its relationship with the United States and the problems it faced in a decade of rapid change. It will also examine GCHQ’s intelligence targets, its codebreaking successes and assess how important Sigint was for British policy towards France, Egypt and Indonesia.  As so many documents  are still retained this paper can only be an outline and doubtless there will be many omissions, but hopefully it will suggest areas of further enquiry and stimulate more research into GCHQ and its impact on British external policy

In the 1960s GCHQ was Britain’s largest intelligence gathering organisation – indeed Aldrich estimates that it was bigger than the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and MI5 combined.​[5]​ By 1966 GCHQ directly employed about 8,000 people, half of whom worked at its main Cheltenham base and a small London office, and with the rest scattered in listening stations in Britain and around the world.​[6]​  Around 3,500 service personnel were also engaged in Sigint work on behalf of GCHQ, which allocated tasks and directed the deployment of army, naval and RAF special signal units to intercept posts at home and abroad.​[7]​  

Despite the organisation’s size the government was able to conceal the costs of GCHQ from parliament and the public by hiding its finances within spending on the MOD and the Foreign Office. A quarter of Sigint expenditure was hidden in the Foreign Office budget and the rest was carried by the three armed services in the MOD.​[8]​ Documents show that in 1965 the planned MOD budget allocation for Sigint and GCHQ for financial year 1969-70 was £23.5-£23.9 million and applying the 75%:25% ratio in funding between the MOD and the Foreign Office, this would have given GCHQ a budget of roughly £32 million.​[9]​

With these resources GCHQ and the military operated a network of signals intercept stations in the United Kingdom and overseas. Some of these facilities were based in Europe using the territory of NATO allies. There were several RAF and army special signals units in West Germany and West Berlin giving coverage of the USSR and the Soviet Bloc, and GCHQ had a listening post at Sinop on Turkey’s Black Sea coast.​[10]​ However, GCHQ’s greatest asset was perhaps the listening posts beyond Europe which exploited the global reach of the British Empire.​[11]​ In the early 1960s there was a chain of intercept stations spread around the world in British colonies, often co-located in military bases and manned by the services. In the Mediterranean Britain had large Sigint facilities at Pergamos and Ayios Nikolaos in Cyprus, which were operated by the army and RAF, and a site at Dingli Royal Navy base on the island of Malta.​[12]​ 

The services also ran intercept posts for GCHQ in the Middle East and Africa. The Aden colony hosted army Sigint facilities and a ‘Special Wireless Station’ at Steamer Point.​[13]​ In the Persian Gulf, army Sigint personnel were apparently based in Bahrain, which was a British protected state.​[14]​ Britain also seems to have built up Sigint facilities in Kenya during the late 1950s and early 1960s in parallel with its construction of a large military base there.​[15]​ The army radio receiver site in Nairobi incorporated a Sigint station, which was described by Joint Planning Staff in 1963 as ‘a very important part of our world wide coverage’.​[16]​ 

The situation was slightly different in Asia because there most British Sigint facilities were run jointly with Australia’s Sigint organisation, the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). Hong Kong was an important centre for combined GCHQ-DSD operations with a base at Little Sai Wan and a direction finding outpost at Kong Wei.​[17]​  In the late 1950s Britain also began building a large RAF radar site at Tai Mo Shan in the New Territories, which at 958 metres was the highest point in Hong Kong. The radar provided early warning for the British Far East Command and the American Pacific Command and, in addition, acted as cover for an important Sigint facility.​[18]​ The DSD and GCHQ operated another station in Singapore at Chai Kang, near Seletar RAF airbase. Known as CK2 (Chai Kang 2), the installation was manned by Australian naval, army and air force personnel and GCHQ and British Admiralty civilians.​[19]​ In South Asia, there appears to have been a Royal Navy Sigint site in independent Sri Lanka during the early 1960s.​[20]​

The Royal Navy also manned intercept bases on remote islands in mid-ocean. On Mauritius, in the Indian Ocean, HMS Mauritius telecommunications centre covered a Sigint station and the navy had another listening post on the isolated Ascension Island in the South Atlantic.​[21]​ There may have been more monitoring sites concealed in other military bases; in 1961 the Joint Planning Staff devised a radical alternative defence strategy which would have abandoned most fixed bases outside Europe and relied on sea borne and air borne forces, island staging posts and facilities in Britain and Australia to defend interests East of Suez. As a counterpart to this study the JIC examined the measures that would be needed ‘to ensure the continued availability of essential intelligence, particularly SIGINT’ if Britain withdrew its East of Suez garrisons.​[22]​  The JIC prepared a paper on ‘The value of overseas bases to the intelligence organisation’ which, in addition to all the bases discussed above, considered Gibraltar, Libya, the Seychelles and the West Indies.​[23]​ The final JIC report has not been released however, so it is uncertain if these territories hosted signals intercept sites or were used for other intelligence purposes.​[24]​

The Sigint bases varied in size and importance. In the early 1960s about 1,000 army and RAF personnel worked at the Pergamos and Ayios Nikolaos stations in Cyprus, compared to 230 Sigint staff at Dingli on Malta and just 28 on tiny Ascension Island.​[25]​  Defence planners regarded the Malta station as important but thought that if necessary most of its facilities could be replaced by expanding the Cyprus Sigint sites.​[26]​ By contrast the loss of Cyprus would cause
A very serious loss of intelligence unless adequate shipborne interception could be provided before withdrawal of our present SIGINT facilities. This could not at best be mounted in less than three years and would entail very high costs.​[27]​

Hong Kong and Singapore were also key bases. Defence officials stressed that Hong Kong was the main source of British intelligence on China and described the Tai Mo Shan Sigint facilities as ‘of great importance to the United Kingdom and United States intelligence on China.’​[28]​ Australian officials told the British in 1968 that they rated the Singapore Sigint station as ‘being of extreme value to them’ partly because of ‘its particular target’, which was almost certainly Indonesia, and partly because its ‘take’ provided a unique contribution to the intelligence exchange with the United States.​[29]​ Overall though, Cyprus appears to have been the most valuable base. Writing in his memoirs about being JIC Chairman between 1968 and 1970 Sir Edward Peck referred to the chain of intercept stations in British colonies and ex-colonies and claimed that ‘Of these, Cyprus was, and still remains, the most important.’​[30]​

Aside from the dedicated Sigint bases, GCHQ also intercepted signals from mobile platforms, such as RAF planes and Royal Navy ships, and from diplomatic premises. Fitzgerald and Leopold claimed that in the 1950s approximately 15 British embassies had a permanent GCHQ presence, although this had been reduced to four by the 1980s.​[31]​  In a similar vein, Richelson and Ball wrote that in the 1980s the Moscow, Nairobi, Pretoria and Lilongwe (capital of Malawi) embassies were used for signals monitoring and probably the missions in Accra, Budapest, Cairo, Freetown, Prague and Warsaw as well.​[32]​ If this was so, it seems likely that during the 1960s GCHQ also used some of these sites. The former GCHQ employee, Jock Kane, has given an example of these types of operations. Kane told author James Bamford that GCHQ secretly gathered Sigint from the British embassy in South Yemen.​[33]​ After South Yemen achieved independence from Britain in 1967 Kane and two GCHQ operators were sent to the embassy under the cover of working for the Diplomatic Wireless Service. Antennas were set up disguised as flag poles and the team intercepted Ethiopian signals traffic for the United States and South Yemeni military communications.

This covert Anglo-American effort to spy on Ethiopian signals illustrates another central feature of GCHQ: its intimate relationship with the American Sigint organisation, the National Security Agency (NSA). GCHQ and the NSA were bound together by the 1946 British-United States Communications Intelligence Agreement and the 1948 UK-USA Communications Intelligence Agreement (UKUSA).​[34]​  These secret agreements created a tight knit Sigint alliance between the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Anglo-Saxon powers agreed to share information and, as a part of a global network, allocated out responsibility for different areas of Sigint gathering to each member. The NSA developed its own overseas Sigint bases, which complemented GCHQ’s chain of listening posts, and they set up liaison teams at each other’s headquarters.​[35]​ 

There are signs that GCHQ and the NSA closely cooperated during the 1960s. Two NSA employees, William Martin and Bernon Mitchell, who defected to the Soviet Union in 1960, claimed that Britain and the United States exchanged information on cryptanalytic methods and results in reading the codes of other nations.​[36]​ A GCHQ official explained to the Cabinet Office in 1968 that ‘there will continue to be a considerable flow from GCHQ of NSA originated material in hard copy and signal form’.​[37]​ Britain also provided space for American Sigint bases in its colonial territories. For example, there was an American Sigint facility on Mauritius and in Cyprus 250 men of the US Naval Security Group carried out work for NSA at a base at Yerolakkos outside Nicosia.​[38]​ The Yerolakkos Sigint base and some co-located CIA communications facilities had been agreed to by the British in a series of informal understandings, some of which were merely verbal.​[39]​

The Sigint relationship with the United States was not an equal one because the NSA was much larger and better funded than GCHQ. In the mid 1960s the NSA commanded around 80,000 staff compared to the 11,500 deployed by GCHQ.​[40]​ Sir Patrick Dean, head of the JIC in the 1950s, observed in 1958 that ‘The United States effort on intelligence was anything from ten to fifteen times as much as ours’, and although this estimate probably included other forms of intelligence, it gives some idea of the disparity in size.​[41]​ British officials who went to Washington and saw the NSA headquarters came back in awe of the organisation’s size and power. After a 1963 visit Major-General Oswald, the Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, told the JIC that the NSA ‘had been particularly striking for its size and enormous resources.’​[42]​  Peck described a later visit in his memoirs and noted that ‘At the NSA I was overwhelmed with the mountains of information’.​[43]​ But although GCHQ had to accept being a junior partner the UKUSA agreement gave Britain many benefits; not just access to NSA Sigint but also American resources that could help GCHQ do things that might otherwise have been beyond its means. By the early 1960s the NSA had supplied GCHQ with computers, probably for decryption, and the United States provided the equipment for the Tai Mo Shan radar and Sigint installation in Hong Kong.​[44]​  

Against this background the 1960s were a difficult and testing time for GCHQ as multiple challenges emerged which threatened to disrupt or restrict its activities. One major problem was the accelerating process of British decolonisation. As the empire melted away GCHQ’s own empire of overseas Sigint stations also faced dissolution. Cyprus, Singapore, Malta, Kenya, Aden and Mauritius all achieved independence during the 1960s and this jeopardised the future of the Sigint stations on their soil and Britain’s ability to maintain a global collection network. London tried to solve this problem in different ways. In Cyprus Britain simply refused to grant independence to the whole of island. Instead, upon independence in 1960 it carved out two Sovereign Base Areas, Dhekelia and Akrotiri, and continued to hold them under British rule. The Dhekelia enclave was specifically designed to include the Pergamos and Ayios Nikolaos Sigint stations and Britain continued to use them during the 1960s.

With Singapore, Malta, Mauritius and Kenya London adopted an alternative approach. Britain conceded sovereignty to friendly nationalists but signed defence agreements which allowed it to retain limited military facilities in the country, including, perhaps unbeknownst to the host government, an intercept site. Singapore became independent as part of Malaysia in 1963 but Britain retained the right to keep indefinitely a large military base complex on the island, which covered the Sigint station.​[45]​ Elsewhere Britain had to accept a fixed tenure. A ten year defence agreement was signed with Malta in 1964, a six year agreement with Mauritius in 1968 and in Kenya, after independence in 1963 Britain was allowed to maintain a signals centre until 1966.​[46]​ In the case of Aden neither solution was possible and decolonisation meant the immediate end of the service Sigint base. Britain was unable to create a viable, friendly successor government in Aden and had to hand over power to Marxist-Arab nationalist guerrillas. The colony became part of the People’s Democratic Republic of South Yemen and there was no chance of Britain being allowed to retain military installations that could conceal an intercept post. So, as seen above, GCHQ instead used the British embassy to spy on the South Yemenis and Ethiopians.

Another problem GCHQ faced was budgetary. During the 1960s the British economy struggled with chronic balance of payments deficits which eventually culminated in the forced devaluation of Sterling in 1968. Throughout the decade governments sought to prop up the pound by cutting state spending and particularly spending overseas. In this bleak fiscal environment GCHQ was very vulnerable; Sigint required cutting edge technology and GCHQ needed to invest in expensive equipment such as advanced electronic interception devices and computers in order to maintain its ability to intercept and decrypt signals. Furthermore, its global chain of listening posts was a drain of foreign exchange. 

GCHQ evidently experienced financial pressures during the 1960s. In August 1961 the JIC discussed a planned 10% cut in the expenditure of the intelligence departments for financial year 1962-1963.​[47]​ Another JIC document showed that in the autumn of 1962 Harold Macmillan’s government asked Professor Stuart Hampshire, a celebrated philosopher and codebreaker in the Second World War, to examine the future of Sigint ‘in light of the various difficulties – political, technical and financial – which were to be foreseen’.​[48]​ Hampshire presented his report by July 1963, although this is still withheld in the British archives.​[49]​ However, Wright, in Spycatcher, painted a slightly different picture. He claimed that because of concerns over the Sigint budget and American pressure on Britain to share the costs of developing Sigint satellites, the 1964-1970 Labour government commissioned a review by Hampshire.​[50]​ This review examined whether Britain had the financial resources to maintain its share of the UKUSA agreement or to develop with the Americans a new generation of spy satellites. According to Wright, the review’s conclusion was that ‘We could not possibly afford to lose the UKUSA exchange, but on the other hand, we could remain in without necessarily funding every technical development pound for dollar.’​[51]​ Wright is not always a reliable source and he may have got his time frame wrong or perhaps Hampshire carried out two separate studies but in any case, the Hampshire review(s) illustrate the financial squeeze that GCHQ was under. After devaluation the organisation again had to make economies and a GCHQ official warned in June 1968 that ‘We…cannot afford as much collection effort as in the past.’​[52]​ 

Britain’s economic crisis also had an indirect adverse effect on GCHQ. To balance budgets and support Sterling the Labour government had to slash overseas defence spending and was forced to close most military bases East of Suez.  In 1968 the Cabinet decided to pull British forces out of the Persian Gulf and Singapore by the end of 1971. Since many Sigint interception posts were manned by the services and concealed and protected by military bases, this decision created problems for GCHQ. The withdrawal of British military forces East of Suez would remove security and cover for some Sigint posts and a decision was apparently taken to move them elsewhere once the services pulled out. The joint DSD/GCHQ station at Singapore was shut down and partially replaced by a facility in Darwin in northern Australia and the Sigint post in Bahrain appears to have been transferred to the island of Masirah in the Sultanate of Oman in 1971.​[53]​ 

The triple effects of decolonisation, economic crisis and military withdrawal from East of Suez made the 1960s a turbulent and disruptive decade for GCHQ but there was another, more insidious threat to its operations. Aldrich has noted the problems GCHQ had in vetting its large numbers of staff and during the 1960s there were several major security breaches.​[54]​ In 1961 a Chinese communist spy ring was uncovered in Hong Kong, which included a translator working at Little Sai Wan, Chan Tak Fei.​[55]​ Chan had been sending information to China for two years. In 1968 British police arrested Douglas Britten, a senior RAF Sigint technician who had spied for the Soviet Union since 1962, including a four year period when he worked at the Pergamos station on Cyprus.​[56]​ Almost exactly at the same time that Britten was caught the Soviets recruited a new agent, Geoffrey Prime. Prime was an RAF corporal at Gatow Sigint base in West Berlin but when he left the service in 1968 he joined GCHQ with the full encouragement of the KGB.​[57]​ He would go on to do serious damage to British Sigint operations in the 1970s.
 
Nonetheless, even though GCHQ experienced major disruption and difficulties it was still able to maintain a global Sigint gathering capability during the 1960s. Its Sigint collection was aimed at a variety of targets. The JIC gave GCHQ and other agencies a list of intelligence requirements in order of priority. In 1960 information on the Soviet strategic nuclear threat topped the JIC’s target list and the greater part of the intelligence effort was focused on the Soviet Bloc.​[58]​ As the 1960s progressed China also became a major area of interest. Lord Mountbatten, the Chief of Defence Staff, explained to the Australian Prime Minister in March 1964 that ‘Mainland China was now a first priority target with the J.I.C. London’.​[59]​ Indeed, in 1966 and 1967 the JIC discussed whether intelligence gathering against the Soviet Bloc should be cut back to allow more resources to be directed at China, which was described as a ‘growth target’.​[60]​  

Yet despite the Cold War context, many of GCHQ’s targets in the 1960s were in fact non-aligned or Western states rather than communist countries. This was partly because the most active military threats to British interests at the time came not from the Soviet Union or China but from a trio of radical, anti-imperialist Third World states: Iraq, Egypt, known then as the United Arab Republic (UAR), and Indonesia. Iraq made a territorial claim to Kuwait in 1961 and Britain had to rush troops into the country to forestall a possible invasion. For the rest of the decade London remained on alert to defend oil rich Kuwait from an Iraqi attack and Mobley has described the importance of intelligence in giving advance warning of possible hostile Iraqi moves.​[61]​ GCHQ and the Cyprus Sigint base were key elements in this surveillance of Iraq.​[62]​  Sergeant John Berry, who served in the 9th Signals Regiment at the Ayios Nikolaos Sigint base in Cyprus between 1966 and 1970, later recalled that his main task had been to chart the activities of the Iraqi army. A small GCHQ team was also based in Kuwait and RAF Comet and Canberra planes flew flights on the Iranian side of the Iran-Iraq border to eavesdrop on Iraqi radio communications.

The UAR and Indonesia posed an even more aggressive challenge to Britain than Iraq. Gamal Nasser, the president of the UAR, had long been the archenemy of British imperialism in the Middle East and had famously humiliated Britain in the 1956 Suez War. This antagonism intensified after Egyptian forces intervened in the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) in 1962 and supported its Nasserite Republican government in a civil war with Royalist rebels. Using the Yemen as a base Nasser sponsored a revolt in the neighbouring South Arabian Federation, a British protectorate which included the Aden colony. From 1963 to 1967 the UAR helped Arab nationalists fight a guerrilla insurgency against British rule in the territory. 

In a similar way Indonesia attacked Britain’s position in South East Asia. Between 1963 and 1966 Indonesia tried to break up the new state of Malaysia, which hosted the Singapore military base and was a key British regional ally. As part of this campaign called ‘Confrontation’ Indonesian guerrillas carried out raids into Borneo and made sea landings in Malaya. Britain defended Malaysia against Confrontation and for three years British and Indonesian soldiers fought a low-level, undeclared war in the jungles of Borneo and Malaya. The UAR and Indonesia were thus direct and dangerous opponents of Britain in the mid 1960s and they were key targets for GCHQ, which could use the Sigint bases in Cyprus, Aden and Singapore to collect intelligence.

It is possible that GCHQ also spied on Britain’s Asian allies in the Confrontation with Indonesia. In August 1965, at the height of the Indonesian campaign, the leaders of Singapore and Malaysia secretly negotiated the separation of Singapore from Malaysia and it broke away to become an independent city state. This was done behind the backs of the British, who had virtually no advance warning of the plan, and it severely undermined British defence strategy in the Far East. London seems to have reacted by trying to make sure that Malaysia and Singapore did not take it by surprise again. In the weeks following the separation the JIC repeatedly discussed the topic ‘Intelligence on Malaysia and Singapore’ and under this heading the SIS, in conjunction with GCHQ and MI5, drew up a list of new intelligence requirements, which were approved by the British High Commissioners in Malaysia and Singapore.​[63]​ At the end of October 1965 the Commonwealth Relations Secretary gave the go ahead to the list of requirements and measures to implement them.​[64]​ A year later, in a misunderstanding between Britain and Malaysia over the disposal of surplus military equipment in Borneo, London had information from ‘secret sources’ about the Malaysian authorities’ thinking.​[65]​ 

If GCHQ did operate against Malaysia and Singapore it would not have been unusual; in the Sigint world concern for national interests tended to outweigh respect for allies’ privacy and during the 1960s Britain spied on other friendly states, such as fellow members of NATO. According to Wright, GCHQ targeted France in order to assist Britain’s application to join the European Economic Community (EEC).​[66]​ Turkey and probably Greece also attracted the attention of GCHQ. These two NATO allies were locked in a bitter dispute over Cyprus and in 1964 and 1967 Ankara came close to invading the island to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Such an invasion could not only trigger a Greco-Turkish war but might also threaten the British Sovereign Base Areas. Britain therefore needed to be fully aware of Turkish and Greek intentions and it used the Cyprus Sigint base to eavesdrop. Berry revealed that the Ayios Nikolaos station had intercepted the communications of ‘NATO partners’ and monitored the planned sailing of the Turkish fleet towards Cyprus, most likely in 1967.​[67]​ 

These were only some of the main targets; GCHQ spied on many other non-aligned or Western countries. Some of these, like Ethiopia, were targeted in response to American requests or to meet Britain’s obligations under the UKUSA agreement. Other states became Sigint targets because of British national requirements. For example, after a colonial, white minority government in Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965 a ‘Special Signals Unit’ was deployed to Lusaka, in neighbouring Zambia.​[68]​ General Franco’s Spain was targeted because of its noisy campaign to drive Britain out of Gibraltar. In 1965 the JIC looked at ways to improve intelligence on Spanish intentions over Gibraltar but concluded that there was ‘little or no likelihood of improving the state of our intelligence, at least the SIGINT aspect, for some months.’​[69]​ However, by 1969 the Governor of Gibraltar could report that ‘“warning” both from 291 Signal Unit and other sources has been further developed and looks much healthier.’​[70]​ 

GCHQ gathered intelligence from its target countries in a variety of ways.  Sigint was (and is) composed of several sub categories: Elint (Electronic Signals Intelligence) was collected by intercepting emissions from foreign electronic devices, such as radar systems. Fisint (Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence) was derived from the emissions produced by the testing of aerospace technology, such as telemetry from ballistic missile tests, and Comint (Communications Intelligence), the most well known form of Sigint, was obtained from communication sources such as radio voice signals, radio teletype and Morse code. Even if foreign communications were securely encrypted GCHQ could still extract intelligence. Traffic analysis and direction finding could provide information on the scale, duration, pattern and position of radio transmissions and from this is was possible to work out the location and organisation of military forces and their operational procedures. 

Normally though the most valuable information would be encrypted and to gain the most benefit GCHQ would not only have to intercept messages but decipher them as well. Cipher systems were becoming more complex and difficult to solve but GCHQ had certain strengths in this field. The UKUSA agreement enabled it to work with the NSA on cracking codes, giving it access to the vast resources and advanced technology of the American agency. GCHQ also had NSA supplied computers and skilled, experienced cryptanalysts. A former NSA analyst who dealt with GCHQ staff in the 1960s later said that 
I got to respect the English analysts very highly. They’re real professionals in GCHQ, and some are master analysts. They’ll stay on the job for twenty-five or thirty years and learn a lot.​[71]​ 

Certain cryptanalytical short cuts were also available. If Britain wanted to spy on friendly or neutral nations it could supply them with insecure code machines. After the Second World War London kept its Ultra code breaking success secret and according to Kahn, it sold German Enigma machines to Third World governments, who were blissfully unaware that GCHQ knew how to read Enigma codes.​[72]​ In his biography of SIS Chief Sir Dick White, which was based on interviews with White and other ex-SIS officers, Tom Bower claimed that during the 1960s Arab states used Enigma code machines or ‘new encoders purchased from a British manufacturer, not realising that the secrets of their machinery were passed on to SIS.’​[73]​  A passage in an official report on the Communications Electronic Security Department (CESD) in 1969 strongly implied that Britain did carry out these sorts of operations. The CESD was responsible for arranging the production of British cryptographic equipment and the secret report noted that 
…there is no better way to successful Sigint that to influence selected target countries by Comsec [communication security] advice to use a source of equipment desired by Sigint, and this can sometimes be done when UK national interest and Comsec factors allow.​[74]​

Another method was to use human intelligence agencies to help unlock the secrets of cryptographic systems; what Kahn has called ‘practical cryptanalysis’.​[75]​ The CIA and the KGB suborned foreign cipher clerks, stole cryptographic material, tapped communication lines and bugged embassies to get information on codes.​[76]​ Britain similarly engaged in ‘practical cryptanalysis’. Wright has described how in the late 1950s and early 1960s MI5 bugged cipher rooms in foreign embassies in London and tapped their telex lines in order to assist GCHQ’s codebreaking efforts.​[77]​ The SIS operated in the same way against embassies abroad.

Partly by using these means GCHQ seems to have broken the codes of several target countries. It is hard to know the full extent of GCHQ’s codebreaking achievements in 1960s because this information was a closely guarded secret at the time and most Sigint material is still withheld by the British government, but it appears that, at a minimum, GCHQ could read some of the codes of France, the UAR, Indonesia and perhaps the Soviet Union.  

In the case of the main intelligence target, the USSR, the picture is mixed. Sigint did undoubtedly provide much useful information on the Soviet Union. A British official noted in 1960 that the bulk of the intelligence on Soviet scientific research and development on missiles came from U2 spyflights and GCHQ intercepts, which was most likely a reference to Fisint derived from Soviet telemetry.​[78]​  Since at the time the Soviet nuclear missile programme was the priority target for JIC this was a significant contribution. Matthew Aid has suggested that NSA in the 1960s may even have made some progress against Soviet high level diplomatic and military cipher systems and been able to gather Comint.​[79]​ The United States allegedly broke the Soviet military’s Silver code and was able to read communications traffic between Moscow and the Soviet embassies in Washington, Hanoi and Cairo. Given the close links between the NSA and GCHQ such American breakthroughs could have aided GCHQ’s cryptanalytical efforts. Britain also managed to intercept telephone conversations between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Leonid Brezhnev in 1967, when Kosygin was staying at Claridge’s Hotel in London and taking part in Vietnam peace talks.​[80]​ On the other hand, a ‘senior GCHQ officer’ told Urban in the 1990s that against the Soviet Union 
there was a time up until the mid-1970s when we used to get useful political and high-level military communications, but that dried up, party because of Prime. We never ever had the Soviet diplomatic traffic.​[81]​
  
GCHQ probably had more success in gathering Comint from its Western and Third World targets. In Spycatcher Wright claimed that GCHQ was able to crack the French diplomatic ciphers, assisted by MI5 tapping telex cables into the French embassy in London.​[82]​ From 1960 to 1963 Britain could read the high grade traffic coming in and out of the French embassy. A similar MI5/GCHQ operation may have been undertaken during Britain’s second application to the EEC in the mid 1960s. In his biography of White Bower wrote that in 1966 ‘Intercepts placed in the French embassy in London would provide a daily appreciation of France’s negotiating position.’​[83]​

According to Wright GCHQ also broke into UAR ciphers in the mid to late 1950s and by 1958 could read all the Egyptian diplomatic cipher groups.​[84]​ This source may have been compromised in September 1960 by NSA defectors Martin and Mitchell, who publicly announced at a press conference in Moscow that the United States had solved the codes of the UAR and six other countries.​[85]​ Presumably after this dramatic exposé Cairo would have improved its communications security but a former British official has informed the author that Britain and the United States could still read Egyptian codes and ciphers to a considerable extent in the 1960s.​[86]​ 

Released British documents do appear to confirm that GCHQ could at least intermittently read Egyptian military traffic. When Nasser first sent UAR forces into the Yemen in October 1962 the British commander in chief in the Middle East immediately asked for photo reconnaissance flights to get information on Egyptian planes using Yemeni air fields.​[87]​ In response, the JIC Chairman, Sir Hugh Stevenson, told the Chiefs of Staff that the flights would add little extra knowledge because ‘They were already in receipt of a great deal of first class intelligence from special sources’.​[88]​ The RAF had already conceded that ‘other sources, particularly Sigint, were producing good results.’​[89]​ The commander’s request was denied, on the grounds that ‘In general our special intelligence gives good coverage of activities in the Yemen.’​[90]​ A year and a half later London seems to have lost this intelligence source. Responding to another request for photo-reconnaissance flights over Yemeni airfields in April 1964, a British official noted that ‘There is some question of the information that we have received in the past from SIGINT being no longer available.’​[91]​ Writing on the same matter, the Air Minister mentioned a ‘great reduction in reliable intelligence on the air order of battle of the UAR forces in the Yemen.’​[92]​ 

Comments by Air Marshall Harold Maguire, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence), suggest that by 1966 these problems had been resolved and Britain once more could read UAR military codes. In July 1966 the Chiefs of Staff discussed UAR military exercises which had taken place at Mersa Matruh on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. Britain had received no prior intelligence warning of the manoeuvres, carried out by a battalion group with air support. Maguire reassured the Chiefs that: 
The lack of warning of a recent UAR exercise at Mersa Matruh was due to a misunderstanding; our organisation in Cyprus had now been alerted to this and in future we could expect 48 hours warning of any UAR military activity. ​[93]​

Maguire’s confident remarks seem to imply that GCHQ could read Egyptian military traffic collected by the Cyprus Sigint base.  

Indonesian codes proved equally vulnerable. Wright revealed in Spycatcher that Britain was able to read Indonesian ciphers throughout the Confrontation and two former British officials have confirmed this to the author.​[94]​ British documents also point to Sigint operations. For example, in 1965 the Foreign Office was worried about the possible sale of advanced American communications equipment to the Indonesians because of the ‘intercept aspect’. The Foreign Office wished to ensure that ‘the GCHQ interests are fully appreciated’.​[95]​ Some of the breaks into Indonesian codes probably came through ‘practical cryptanalysis’ because according to Wright, MI5 and GCHQ bugged the cipher room in the Indonesian embassy in London but Britain’s allies may also have helped.​[96]​  During an earlier colonial dispute over the West Irian territory the Netherlands broke the Indonesian diplomatic and military codes and historian Cees Wiebes has claimed that the Dutch supplied GCHQ with the Indonesian air forces codes in the late 1950s.​[97]​ The Australian DSD, working from the Singapore Sigint base, almost certainly gave support as well. Indeed, Sir Bernard Burrows, the Chairman of JIC, observed in December 1965 that ‘Australian intelligence plays a critical role as far as Indonesia and confrontation is concerned.’​[98]​

Overall then GCHQ seems to have performed reasonably well in the 1960s. It was able to read the traffic of several target states and collect Comint. Although it may not have broken all Soviet ciphers (and little is known of operations against China), GCHQ could read the codes of the two states sponsoring insurgencies against British interests, the UAR and Indonesia, and of France, a state which stood in the way of a central British foreign policy objective, entry into the EEC. These successes raise questions about the importance of Sigint for British external policy during the 1960s. How useful and influential was Sigint? Did it help British policymakers achieve their goals in relation to France, the UAR and Indonesia? 

Judging by the claims made in Spycatcher, GCHQ did produce high quality Sigint on France in the early 1960s. During the British EEC application every move made by the French was monitored and, in Wright’s words, ‘The intelligence was avidly devoured by the Foreign Office.’​[99]​ Verbatim copies of cables from French President Charles De Gaulle were regularly passed to the British Foreign Secretary in his red box. These insights into the French position probably helped British negotiators in the protracted talks on entry into the Common Market; the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office is supposed to have described the Sigint product as ‘Priceless material…simply priceless.’​[100]​ Yet, as Wright himself admitted, while the Sigint may have been of great tactical use it did not enable Britain to join the EEC. De Gaulle vetoed British entry in 1963 and in 1967. Despite having good intelligence sources London was unable to entice, persuade or coerce De Gaulle into dropping his opposition to British membership of the Common Market. 

Britain gathered Sigint on the UAR and other Arab states during the Middle East crisis of May-June 1967, which culminated in the Six Day War.​[101]​ In May 1967 Nasser removed UN peacekeepers from the Israeli-Egyptian border, massed thousand of UAR troops in Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. On 5 June Israel responded with a devastating surprise air attack on the UAR air force and it then swiftly defeated the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. GCHQ followed the dramatic events from the nearby Cyprus Sigint base. According to Berry, the Ayios Nikolaos station listened to the Egyptian panic as Israeli planes first attacked their airfields, helped by fact that the Egyptians, in their confusion, abandoned all attempts at code.​[102]​  Berry even heard an Egyptian soldier cry out to Allah as his tank was hit by an Israeli shell. Shortly after the war ended a Foreign Office official noted that the ‘intelligence gathering facilities’ in Cyprus ‘have proved of great value in recent weeks’.​[103]​ Britain also had a tap on an Egyptian landline from Cairo to Ismailia which Nasser believed was totally secure.​[104]​ The Sigint may have been supplemented by human intelligence as it appears that Britain had a high level agent in Egypt in 1967.​[105]​

In the build up to the war these sources seem to have provided Britain with sensitive intelligence on the UAR’s position. On 29 May the Chiefs of Staff were given detailed information on the UAR units concentrated at Sharm el Sheik, overlooking the Straits of Tiran, and told that the Egyptians expected an Israeli attack there, possibly by paratroops combined with an amphibious landing.​[106]​   The UAR was also known to have asked the Soviet Union for large quantities of new equipment, including 200 T62 or T55 tanks. Bower claimed that GCHQ provided ‘the raw material which anticipated Israel’s attack on its neighbours and its victory after six days’ and the British assessment of the relative military balance just prior to the war did correctly predict a rapid Israeli victory over the Arab states.​[107]​

Yet in this instance Sigint does not appear to have had a major impact on British policy.​[108]​ Britain disliked Nasser’s aggressive actions and in May Prime Minister Harold Wilson called for Western intervention to raise the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. Wilson touted the idea of Britain and the United States organising a multinational fleet that would keep the Straits of Tiran open to Israeli shipping.  As the crisis unfolded, however, the Foreign Office lost enthusiasm for this proposal. Officials began to speculate that it might be preferable if Israel took military action and dealt with Nasser by itself. Presumably this line of thinking was encouraged by the intelligence assessment, partly based on Sigint, which forecast quick Israeli success. If Britain had expected an Arab victory or a long war it might have pushed plans for a multilateral maritime force much harder.  But there were plenty of other, more telling reasons why London backed away from multilateral intervention: most of the Cabinet disapproved of the scheme, very few maritime nations were willing to take part and Arab states threatened to retaliate against British oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. 

Sigint on the UAR was perhaps more useful to Britain in south west Arabia where, unlike in Sinai or the Straits of Tiran, it was itself involved in a conflict with Nasser. In this area Sigint helped British policymakers in several ways. Firstly, it allowed London to monitor developments in the Yemen Civil War, as the Royalist rebels fought Egyptian and Republican government troops between 1962 and 1967. According to Bower, GCHQ intercepted messages between Egyptian army commanders struggling against the Royalists in the mountains and deserts of the Yemen.​[109]​  Robin Young, the British Senior Adviser (West) in Aden, tracked the progress of the Royalists using intercepts of Republican and UAR radio traffic.​[110]​ This type of intelligence seems to have fed into ministerial debates in London about whether the Royalists could survive and whether Britain should give them covert support.​[111]​ 

It is highly likely that Sigint on the UAR forces in the Yemen also revealed Egyptian efforts to foment a nationalist revolt in the neighbouring South Arabian Federation (SAF). By 1964 London knew that the UAR military commander in the Yemen was actively supporting an Arab nationalist guerrilla movement, the National Liberation Front (NLF), in the British protectorate.​[112]​ The UAR had allocated thousands of rifles, automatic weapons and mines for use in subversive operations and the Foreign Office even had the names of Egyptian intelligence officers in Yemeni-SAF border towns like Baidha and Qataba who directed and coordinated NLF activity. 

Britain did not passively accept the Egyptian subversion in the SAF. It responded in kind, carrying out covert operations in the Yemen, and it seems to have employed Sigint as an aid to these activities. Jones and Mawby have shown that Britain gave limited support to the Yemeni Royalists in the civil war and, perhaps more significantly, stimulated an insurrection against the Egyptians on the Yemeni-SAF border.​[113]​  In April 1964 ministers agreed to supply money to dissident Yemeni tribes up to 20 miles over the border and encourage them to attack the Egyptians and the guerrillas.​[114]​ These operations were codenamed ‘Rancour’. After some initial set backs SIS took tighter control over the ‘Rancour’ operation and for the next three years British officials supplied arms, money and training to tribesmen and directed their attacks on the Egyptians in the Yemen.​[115]​ Sigint appears to have identified targets for raids; discussing the SIS operations Bower wrote that ‘intelligence from GCHQ intercepts pinpointed the enemy’s location and weak points.’​[116]​ On a tactical level ‘Rancour’ does seem to have worked because it drove the UAR intelligence officers out of Baidha and reduced rebel activity near the border.​[117]​ The assessment of Lord Shackleton in 1967 was that 
RANCOUR operations in the Yemen have been extremely successful. They have been effective both in driving the Egyptians back from parts of the South Arabian frontier and in causing the Egyptians considerable inconvenience by tying down a disproportionate number of Egyptian forces. Information we have received demonstrates that as a result the Egyptians have even been near to losing control in some areas.​[118]​

Another way to apply counter pressure on the UAR was through propaganda. During the Yemeni Civil War Egyptian planes secretly bombed Royalist fighters and villages with poison gas and British ministers were keen to expose Nasser’s use of chemical weapons.​[119]​ If it could be revealed that he was gassing his fellow Arabs in the Yemen it might tarnish his exalted image in the Arab world. Although the gas raids took place in remote parts of the Yemen London was well informed about them. A British official noted in 1967 that there was ‘a considerable amount of intelligence’ available on this topic, ‘much of it of a very high security classification.’​[120]​ At least some of this intelligence was Sigint: commenting on an Egyptian mustard and phosgene gas bombing raid in the Yemen in May 1967 the Chief of Defence Staff informed Defence Secretary Denis Healey that ‘We have firm evidence through intercepts of the use of gas in these attacks’.​[121]​  The information needed to be handled carefully in order to protect intelligence sources but if collaborative accounts could be provided from quotable sources, such as Red Cross officials and journalists visiting the Royalist areas in the Yemen, it could be exploited by the covert propaganda arm of the Foreign Office, the Information Research Department (IRD).​[122]​ In 1967 the IRD successfully spread unattributable propaganda about the Egyptian use of gas to media outlets in the Indian sub-continent and Europe.​[123]​ For example, it supplied material to the popular French photo-news weekly Paris Match, which in March 1967 ran a story on Egyptian gas attacks in the Yemen.​[124]​ 

Sigint thus helped Britain to embarrass and harass the Egyptians over their intervention in the Yemen. But, as in the case of France and entry into the EEC, while Sigint was tactically useful it did not enable Britain to achieve its overall objective. In spite of his difficulties in the Yemen Nasser continued to support the nationalist rebels in the SAF and in 1967 Britain was forced to withdraw from the territory and grant independence. Indeed, in contrast to the apparently good intelligence on the Yemen British intelligence on the insurgency in the SAF was poor. The army had to rely on interrogation of suspects to gain information on the guerrillas and GCHQ does not appear to have been of much assistance.​[125]​ 

It was in the Confrontation with Indonesia that GCHQ had its greatest success. During the conflict British policymakers had very good intelligence on Indonesia and the JIC even received ministerial commendation for the quality of its reporting.​[126]​ Some of the intelligence came from human sources but Sigint seems to have been more important; Anthony Golds, who headed the Foreign Office/Commonwealth Relations Office’s Joint Malaysia-Indonesia Department from 1964 to 1965, described it as ‘vital’ in the Confrontation.​[127]​ GCHQ could read the Indonesian military and diplomatic codes and it could therefore give advance information on Jakarta’s plans and intentions, although due to the peculiarities of the Indonesian political system this intelligence was not always perfect. The Indonesian president, Sukarno, was an erratic, capricious dictator, prone to impulsive moves, such as announcing in January 1965 that Indonesia was leaving the United Nations without first informing the Indonesian UN mission in New York.​[128]​ Since in this case Sukarno did not even tell his own diplomats about his plans access to Indonesian diplomatic traffic could not give Britain any forewarning. Furthermore, by 1965 many Indonesian army leaders were opposed to the Confrontation policy and they secretly obstructed operations in Borneo, which may have confused British officials reading the orders being sent down to them from Jakarta.​[129]​  Yet despite the sometimes Byzantine complexities of the Indonesian state the Sigint was helpful. Looking back at the Confrontation with the Chiefs of Staff, Sir John Grandy, the commander of British forces in the Far East from 1965 to 1967, observed that ‘We had enjoyed excellent intelligence of Indonesian intentions which had contributed greatly to the success of the campaign’​[130]​  
 
Policymakers could also use Sigint to monitor how the Indonesians reacted to British operations in the Confrontation and decide how far they could go without provoking a wider war with Sukarno.​[131]​ To curb the Indonesian guerrilla raids the British government authorised patrols across the border into Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of Borneo. From July 1964 British troops could offensively patrol up to 3,000 yards over the border. However, there was considerable apprehension in London about taking such aggressive action and ministers wanted the operations, which took place over an ill-defined jungle border, to be kept secret, limited and deniable. In November 1964 Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, the commander-in-chief in the Far East, asked for permission to extend the patrols to five miles inside Kalimantan but this request was rejected by the Chiefs of Staff, who feared that deeper operations might not be credibly deniable and could escalate the conflict.

The Chiefs soon had to rethink their position.  In December 1964 ‘intelligence reports from delicate sources’ which ‘cannot be disclosed to the Malaysians’ (probably Sigint) revealed that the Indonesians planned to massively increase their forces on the border with Malaysia, deploying two brigades to Kalimantan and two brigades to the island of Sumatra opposite Malaya.​[132]​ To counteract the build up Begg again requested an extension of the cross border patrols and this time he used Sigint to support his case. Decrypted Indonesian military signals showed that the local commanders in Kalimantan always reported any clash, even those in which their troops were defeated, as a great victory.​[133]​ They had been loath to report any of Britain’s earlier cross border operations and instead had described imaginary attacks of their own. Begg told Australian and New Zealand diplomats that 
…local Indonesian commanders have proved reluctant to admit to Djakarta the circumstances in which they have suffered casualties. They have represented rather that these occurred in “aggressive” operations they have carried out on Sarawak’s [part of Borneo] soil.​[134]​ 

Begg therefore suggested to the Chiefs of Staff that larger British cross border raids, attacking Indonesian camps, staging areas and supply dumps up to a depth of 10,000 yards, offered no greater risk, as the ‘[Indonesian] High Command might well remain in ignorance of them.’​[135]​

Begg’s proposal was accepted by the Chiefs of Staff and senior ministers and in January 1965 he was given permission to extend operations up to 10,000 yards over the Indonesian border and to make attacks on specific targets.​[136]​ These new operations were codenamed ‘Claret’. Sigint seems to have helped persuade policymakers to approve deeper cross border operations. Certainly Wilson was aware of the Sigint evidence; in a message to the Australian Prime Minister informing him about ‘Claret’ he predicted that the Indonesians would probably not complain as they had not reacted to Britain’s earlier patrols and ‘the local commanders seem to have been reluctant to report accurately to their superiors what happens on their side of the border.’​[137]​ 

The decision to approve ‘Claret’ was significant because the operations proved to be very effective.​[138]​ They inflicted a high casualty ratio on the Indonesians and forced them to withdraw their patrol bases from the frontier area and dissipate their efforts in defensive measures. Despite the build up of Indonesian troops for the rest of the conflict Jakarta was unable to increase or even sustain its level of guerrilla activity in Borneo. It can therefore be argued that Sigint gave London the necessary confidence to take the cross border military measures which in the end contained Confrontation. Furthermore, Sigint helped plan individual ‘Claret’ operations, probably identifying targets for attack.​[139]​ 

Sigint also assisted British covert propaganda during the Confrontation. In October 1965 there was an attempted coup in Jakarta which the Indonesian army blamed on the Indonesian communist party (the PKI). The army responded by brutally repressing the communists and it began to challenge Sukarno for political control. An IRD team, based in Singapore and led by Norman Reddaway, encouraged the power struggle by mounting a vigorous covert propaganda campaign against Sukarno and the PKI. Reddaway was keen to exploit Sigint in this propaganda offensive. In late October 1965 he discussed with Brian Tovey, the GCHQ chief in Singapore, the possibility of getting newsworthy pieces from the intelligence machinery and passing them on unattributably to publicists.​[140]​ On at least one occasion this does seem to have happened. Lashmar and Oliver claimed that Britain learnt from Sigint about secret contacts between Sukarno’s government and the disgraced PKI leader Aidit, who at the time was being hunted by the military for involvement in the coup plot. This story was then publicised by Reddaway via media outlets in Hong Kong.​[141]​ 

It is clear that Britain used Sigint in similar ways in the Confrontation and in Yemen/Aden. Sigint provided information on Indonesian and Egyptian military movements and intentions, supported secret British cross border operations, ‘Rancour’ and ‘Claret’, and provided material for unattributable propaganda by IRD. Yet the outcomes of the two conflicts were very different. Whereas Britain had to withdraw in ignominy from the SAF, in the Confrontation it achieved its goals. The Indonesian army emerged victorious in the internal power struggle and in March 1966 it effectively seized control from Sukarno.​[142]​ The army then proceeded to make peace with Malaysia and Britain and ended Confrontation in August 1966. For once the tactical advantages given by Sigint had carried over into a strategic success for Britain.  

For GCHQ as an organisation the 1960s were a difficult decade. Decolonisation, military withdrawal from East of Suez and financial crises all adversely affected its operations. The global network of intercept sites shrank down and became more dependent on insecure treaty arrangements with independent states rather than bases in British colonies. These changes were largely due to Britain’s decline as a global power as the country completed decolonisation and grappled with an overvalued currency and a sluggish economy. Britain’s armed forces, which were intimately connected to GCHQ, experienced a similar contraction during the 1960s. Yet although GCHQ was weakened it remained a powerful Sigint organisation. It was still one of the leading Sigint agencies in the world, benefitted from close ties to the NSA and could gather Sigint beyond Europe in sensitive areas such as the Middle East and South East Asia. With these assets GCHQ continued to produce valuable intelligence for British policymakers in the 1960s. In December 1964, at a time when Britain was struggling with the Egyptians in Yemen/Aden and the Indonesians in Borneo, Burrows told the JIC that ‘Everyone recognised the immensely important part that Sigint played in intelligence, and particularly its present operational value.’​[143]​ 

GCHQ spied on a wide variety of countries. The main targets were the Cold War adversaries, the Soviet Bloc and China, but a considerable amount of effort also went into tapping the communications of non-communist states. In some ways this reflected the threats Britain faced; often the challenge to British interests came not from communism but from Third World anti-imperialists like Nasser and Sukarno. It must be noted though that GCHQ freely targeted Western allies as well. The case of Malaysia illustrates the ambiguous nature of alliance outside the charmed circle of UKUSA members. Britain and Malaysia were bound by a defence agreement and they fought together against Indonesian Confrontation. Malaysia also hosted a British Sigint base in Singapore. But despite this closeness there are signs that Britain withheld intelligence on Indonesia from the Malaysians during Confrontation, probably because it was based on Sigint.​[144]​  And Britain may even have spied on Malaysian communications from 1965. 
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